Thirty-six US states have already enacted some form of seller's property condition disclosure law. At a time when there is a movement in this direction nationally, this paper attempts to ascertain the factors that lead states to adopt disclosure law. Motivation for the study stems from the fact that not all states have yet adopted the law, and states that have enacted the law have done so in different years. The analytical structure employs hazard models, using a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a panel of 50 US States spanning 21 years, from 1984 to 2004. The proportional hazard analysis of law adoption reveals that greater number of disciplinary actions tends to favor passage of the law. Greater broker supervision, implying generally higher awareness among real estate agents, seems to have a negative impact on the likelihood of a state adopting a property condition disclosure law.
There was a time when 'caveat emptor', or 'buyer beware', ruled in the housing industry 3 .
Frequently, buyers used to find material defects after the purchase. Many lawsuits were filed against real estate agents or sellers. The economic intuition behind the scenario closely resembles that of used car sales. The seller has better (or more) information about the condition of the house than the buyer can possibly have, which entails the usual story of information asymmetry. This information asymmetry in property markets was brought to public attention by the path-breaking 1984 California appellate court verdict 4 , which made the case for requiring a seller's disclosure statement in real estate transactions.
This paper analyzes the seller's property condition disclosure law. We attempt to determine the factors that explain adoption of the disclosure law. The analytical structure employs hazard models, using a unique and rich set of economic and institutional attributes for the housing market in a yearly panel of 50 US States spanning 21 years, from 1984 to 2004, to address the research question. Among the institutional controls, the number of disciplinary actions taken in conjunction with formal complaints against the real estate licensees, and the extent of broker supervision of the real estate salespersons seem to matter in predicting adoption of the law.
The study contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, using empirical modeling, it adds to our understanding of the property condition disclosure law and the institutional environment of the residential real estate industry. The paper takes a first step in analyzing a real estate law that affects real estate transaction procedure. Second, understanding the law adoption process helps in highlighting the effect of the law on various institutional procedures in the housing sector. Third, the paper provides a framework and makes the case for empirical analyses of policy statutes in the field of law and economics, especially in the field of real estate law.
Beginning in 1984, numerous legal proceedings have brought greater transparency in property transactions. In the last two decades, many lawsuits in the real estate industry had something to do with property condition and non-disclosure of the material defects at the time of sales. Using data on the claims against errors and omissions insurance by the real estate licensees in five states, Zumpano and Johnson (2003) finds that fully 76% of all suits against real estate salespeople were related to the condition of the property being sold 5 . Increasingly complex real estate transaction procedures have led to homebuyers' greater reliance on real estate agents' assistance in the decision making process, this, in turn, placed real estate professionals in a more litigious environment efforts to satisfy more demanding customers could become costly. This has also increased the skill requirements for real estate salespersons, due to new environmental, health, tax, and mortgage issues and standards. Therefore, two conflicting interests arise for real estate professionals -offering exclusive services for customer satisfaction and taking the risk of making mistakes that may lead to lawsuits. Enacting new laws to protect market interests deemed to be a plausible solution by some state legislatures.
The seller's disclosure statement protects both the buyer and the seller from possible disputes after the transaction. It also prevents any misplaced liability on the seller and the broker who represents the seller. Thus, it can be viewed as a tool to avoid lawsuits, which are viewed as deadweight losses to some extent 6 . Zumpano and Johnson (2003) Lefcoe (2004) provides an excellent discussion on many different aspects of the property condition disclosure law.
required disclosures. For instance, earthquake hazard disclosure is required in California, but not in New York or in most of the Midwest states.
A Property condition disclosure statement is not a warranty of the unit's condition 9 . It is rather a representation of the information about the property condition by the seller at the time of sale.
Scholars argue that the seller-provided inspection is not a substitute for the seller disclosure form, since many material defects may not be revealed by an inspector 10 . For example, inspectors are not supposed to inspect for rodents, or check the walls, foundation, the air-conditioning, and heating system, or know about flooding, and many other potential areas for material defects.
There have been a number of studies on the property condition disclosure law and its impact on different aspects of the residential real estate market. The studies (Pancak, Miceli and Sirmans (1996) , Moore and Smolen (2000) , Zumpano and Johnson (2003) , and Lefcoe (2004)) suggest a positive impact of the law on property values, buyer's satisfaction, broker's avoidance of risk etc.
Exploiting the MSA level variation in house prices, Nanda (2005) (2004), we not only look at the political factors, but also the factors that closely describe the institutional and economic environment of the housing market. We also incorporate across state heterogeneity in our empirical structure.
The rest of the study proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the estimation methods; Section 3 describes economic and institutional variables and develops empirically testable hypotheses; Section 4 analyzes, compares, and contrasts the results from different model specifications; and we conclude in Section 5.
An Empirical Framework for Analyzing Law Adoption 11
In many analyses of statutes, the statute is assumed to be exogenous. However, one might argue that many different legal, economic, and special interest group activities precede government enactment of a law. Following Kiefer (1988) We model duration dependence by specifying a probability distribution for the survival spell until "death", which here is the adoption of a property condition disclosure law 12 . The probability distribution of duration is given by
which specifies the probability that the random variable T is less than some value t; f(t) is the corresponding density function. One useful representation of the duration data is the survivor
Using equations (2.1) and (2.2), we derive the hazard function for duration analysis
) (t λ is the rate at which spells will be completed at duration t; given that they survive until t. Equation (2.3) enables us to distinguish between positive and negative duration dependence.
Different distributional assumptions can be made for ) (t λ . Most commonly used are exponential and Weibull distribution.
With the basic structure, as outlined by equations (2.1) through (2.3), next we try to specify the covariates for duration dependence. A simple formulation incorporates time-invariant regressors in a proportional hazard framework, which can be written as 12 The baseline specification draws on Kiefer(1988) and Wooldridge(2002) . (2.4) is the logit estimation, where each unit contributes several terms to a logit likelihood function, one term for each period for which the unit was at risk of leaving the treatment stage 13 . Typically,
The baseline hazard can be specified by allowing the intercept to be different for logit formulations of each time-period (i.e. by including a dummy variable for each representative period) or by including a function of time. We assume that once a law is adopted, it will remain, and so we eliminate the observations after the disclosure law has been adopted. This censoring of the data is reasonable, given that no state has ever repealed the property condition disclosure law.
The hazard function can be represented by a standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Therefore, we could estimate the model after conditioning on the event not yet having occurred using a standard logit specification. function as follows:
assuming that the limit exists.
One popular way of specifying the hazard function is
where θ is a vector of unknown parameters. , which, in our case, is a year. Equation (2.7) implies that time-varying covariates have a multiplicative effect in each time interval (for M intervals) and it allows a flexible baseline hazard, which is common to all units. Incorporating time-varying covariates is an important step in analyzing law adoption in our panel data framework as the law has been adopted at different times by different states.
Equations (2.1) through (2.7) represent the empirical structure as outlined in Kiefer (1988), and de Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh (2004) . However, an important aspect of the law adoption process is that it varies across states. The heterogeneity appears from the fact that different states in our sample have potentially different distributions of the duration dependence. Thus, we are sampling from a mixture distribution. Although we are controlling for a number of time-varying observables, there may still be some heterogeneity due to presence of important unobservables.
The problem becomes an omitted regressor problem. The law adoption process may be affected by some institutional factors for which we cannot control. Building upon the empirical structure in Kiefer (1988) With single-spell data (since no state has ever repealed the property condition disclosure law), we cannot allow general correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the time-varying covariates. Therefore, we assume that the covariates are strictly exogenous, conditional on unobserved heterogeneity, and that the unobserved heterogeneity is independent of covariates 14 .
We try two common distributions for specifying frailty or heterogeneity, which are normal and gamma distributions. 
Institutional Variables and Hypotheses
Numerous lawsuits against the real estate licensees made the case for adoption of disclosure laws.
Potentially the legal activities are governed by the institutional characteristics of the state. Various institutional factors influence the adoption of laws and regulations. We formulate and test various hypotheses regarding the institutional factors in housing market that influence the adoption of property condition disclosure laws. Our goal is to condition on pre-disclosure characteristics to ascertain which factors lead to the adoption. Institutional factors related to real estate licensing are of particular interest, since dissatisfaction with licensing services and strong lobbying by the licensee associations are viewed as important forces behind successful adoption of mandatory disclosure laws. Pancak and Sirmans (2005) attempt to find the effects of different institutional factors on the quality of services by real estate licensees. They measure quality of services by the number of disciplinary actions taken against real estate licensees, using controls such as whether the state has mandatory property condition disclosure, extent of broker supervision of salespersons, etc. A major goal of property condition disclosure law is to decrease agents' liability for non-disclosure.
Therefore, presumably states with some form of disclosure law will have fewer instances of nondisclosure and thus fewer transaction grievances. Moreover, Zumpano and Johnson (2003) conclude that mandatory property condition disclosure reduces claims on errors and omissions insurance. Therefore, we postulate that the level of disciplinary actions, relative to formal complaints, indicates customer dissatisfaction, and thus is an important factor in predicting law adoption by the regulatory authorities 17 .
Often real estate licensees are liable for both intentional and unintentional non-disclosure of many aspects of the housing transaction. We hypothesize that greater supervision would prevent intentional and unintentional mistakes by the salespersons. As in Pancak and Sirmans (2005) , we construct this supervision variable as the ratio of number of brokers to number of salespersons.
As constructed, the variable may also capture variations in experience and education among 17 When the disciplinary actions figure is missing or zero, we take the average of the figures within a 1-year range. When the total disciplinary actions figure is missing in ARELLO reports, if available, we take the sum of the figures under different categories of disciplinary actions, or we take the sum of the actions by consent and number of formal hearing as number of disciplinary actions (this is the case until 1986). Then we take sum of disciplinary actions and formal hearings from column of complaints resulting in some actions. Both of these are expected to provide the number of complaints having enough substance to attract legal attention. This is typically the case with Arizona and Hawaii for 1984 to 1986.
licensees. In the analysis, this variable is an important factor, as it captures two important things: licensee awareness and the resulting effect on customer satisfaction or the quality of service. 
Results

With Time-Invariant Institutional Variables
As outlined in section (2.2), our estimation strategy is one of hazard analysis where we model the duration dependence conditioning on the adoption not yet having occurred. We start with models with time-invariant attributes. Table ( 2) reports results from four different model specifications for the proportional hazard model of disclosure law adoption. This analysis is done with the statelevel data (1,050 observations). We use the pre-disclosure average number of disciplinary actions taken against the licensees, licensee supervision index, and number of licensees as controls for pre-treatment characteristics 18 . Essentially, we assume that these institutional characteristics are exclusive to the housing market. We still use the economic variables as time-varying attributes since they are not directly associated with the housing market. The columns are distinguished by the inclusion of lagged percentage change in HPI. We include the housing price growth rate to capture the housing trend of the market. Lagged value is more appropriate, as the variable should not greatly influence the adoption year. It seems that inclusion of the second lagged percentage change in HPI matters in this set-up. We also allow the intercepts to differ across the census divisions.
Most importantly, as hypothesized, the average number of disciplinary actions relative to number of complaints seems to affect adoption. A greater number of disciplinary actions relative to complaints favors adoption of a state mandate (robust significant positive impact across the columns). The greater the degree of broker supervision, the lower is the state's likelihood of adopting the law (robust significant negative impact across the columns). This supports the postulate that greater broker supervision, by ensuring fewer mistakes and greater awareness among the salespersons of the market practices and standards, tends to reduce dissatisfaction among homeowners, which, in turn, lowers the number of lawsuits that might trigger adoption.
Interestingly, as observed in Table ( 1), Republican control tends to favor (although not statistically significant) the adoption of property condition disclosure laws. Republican control tends to be associated with regulations that promote transparency in housing transactions. More active housing markets seem to adversely affect the likelihood of adopting the disclosure law.
Possibly, consumers as well as licensees prefer to neglect the disclosure issues when housing markets are 'hot'. In a market of high appreciation rates, it may be better idea to sell the newly acquired 'lemon' rather than registering complaints or lawsuits.
With Time-Varying Institutional Variables
We consider models that include time-varying covariates; address the measurement error problem; and control for state level heterogeneity. Table ( 3) takes the initial specification, as in column (4) in Table ( 1), and reports alternative econometric specifications. In this analysis, we use time-varying institutional attributes, which is a major departure from Table ( 2). Incorporating time-varying covariates is an important step in analyzing law adoption in our panel data framework, as the law has been adopted in different periods by different states, and it adds more information to our estimation.
In Table ( 3), we suppress the estimates on economic variables except housing price growth rate, as those are robust across specifications. For the hazard analyses in this table, we assume most the commonly used Weibull distribution for duration dependence. Column (1) in Table (3) reports estimates from the hazard model with time-varying covariates with interval of one year. We use this model as a baseline specification in this analysis. Although we do not find significant estimates to test our main hypotheses, the signs are consistent with our postulates. As expected, number of disciplinary actions relative to number of complaints is positive, and the supervision index is negative. The 'hot' market argument regarding the housing price growth rate holds in this model. One concern that arises from insignificant estimates on institutional controls is that legislators may not have observed current year values in deciding on law adoption. We use first lagged values of the institutional variables in column (2), but it does not significantly improve our findings.
Measurement error is a major issue with the institutional variables. Moreover, legislators may look over a longer period to formulate their opinion about the need for such laws. Adopting a law is a slow process with debates, lobbying, deliberations, etc. In order to address the measurement error problem, in column (3) we take the average of second to fourth lagged values for the institutional controls. The estimates support our concern, and indicate a significant positive effect of number of disciplinary actions relative to number of complaints, and a significant negative effect of the supervision index. These two variables relate to most important hypothesis of the paper: a higher level of consumer dissatisfaction, as indicated by disciplinary actions and complaints against real estate licensees, and a lower level of broker supervision (implying illprepared real estate agents who intentionally or unintentionally fail to disclose) that tend to encourage adoption. This is well established in column (3). The 'hot' market argument regarding the housing price growth rate holds in this model.
The law adoption process varies across states, depending on many factors. The heterogeneity stems from the fact that different states in our sample have potentially different distributions for the duration dependence. In columns (4) and (5), we try to address the heterogeneity concern in a few different ways by building upon our specification in column (3). First, in column (4), we assume that the heterogeneity term ν in equation (2.8) is normally distributed. We find a robust and significant effect of number of disciplinary actions relative to number of complaints and the supervision index. To explore further the concern that heterogeneity is present, we assume a gamma distributed frailty term in column (5). We find results similar to those in column (4) for our major hypothesis of consumer dissatisfaction. The effect of disciplinary actions relative to number of complaints becomes insignificant in column (5), but the general magnitudes of the estimates for disciplinary actions relative to number of complaints, supervision index, and house price growth are quite stable over all three specifications in columns (3), (4), and (5).
Our empirical analysis, as presented in Tables (2) and (3), supports two key postulates. A higher level of consumer dissatisfaction, as indicated by a higher level of disciplinary actions and complaints against real estate licensees, and a lower level of broker supervision, implying that " … mistakes can be made that will damage one or more parties to a real estate sale", both increase the likelihood of adopting a property condition disclosure law 19 .
Conclusion
At least two-thirds of the US states have already mandated some form of seller's property condition disclosure statement, and there is a movement in this direction nationally. A formal attempt has been made to explain the adoption of the disclosure law. Among the institutional controls, the number of disciplinary actions taken in conjunction with formal complaints against the real estate licensees, and the extent of broker supervision of real estate salespersons seem to matter in predicting adoption of the law. Specifically, a greater number of disciplinary actions tends to favor passage of the law. Greater broker supervision, implying more awareness among real estate agents, seems to have a negative impact on the likelihood of a state adopting a disclosure law. The study, on a more general note, offers an analytical framework for understanding the adoption of other laws or institutional arrangements. NOTES: Models include logarithm of time as the baseline hazard specification and census division fixed effects. All findings for economic variables in Table 2 are robust across the models considered in Table 3 . Clustered standard errors are reported within parentheses. '*', '**', and '***' denote 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels. This analysis includes data for all 50 states, from 1984 to 2004.
